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#### Executive authority post 9/11 is rooted in orientalist discourses. The claim that war powers are necessary for protection and to prevent threats creates a state of perpetual warfare which circumscribes particular identities onto people and ensures constant mobilization

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The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes, reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a dis-course of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference. While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cultural signification. Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that underpins the measures highlighted above is one that is now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identification, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some ‘precautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its individual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures. Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as threats to security. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of direct war, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacification of the Middle East as a political region. When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimization are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to limit policing, military and intelligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates discourses on politics, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external.

#### Obama’s counter-prolif posture is based on the Bush Doctrine interp of war powers authority to preempt

Mathew Waxman, September 11, 2013. “The Most Puzzling Line of the President’s Speech,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/the-most-puzzling-line-of-the-presidents-speech/

My first question is to what he’s referring here, or to which part of the past decade. President Bush undoubtedly held very broad views of war powers, but the two major wars embarked up during his presidency, in Afghanistan and Iraq, were clearly congressionally authorized, and Congress has played a significant role in pushing their wind-down. The 2011 Libya intervention, by contrast, was not congressionally authorized, and the Obama administration adopted the view that the War Powers Resolution did not apply to the operations there (which, unlike the contemplated Syria operations, aimed to help bring down a regime). The Obama administration has also resisted the idea that Congress should re-examine the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which has been interpreted to apply in geographically broad ways that may or may not have been intended by Congress at the time it was adopted. My second question is why, if he believes it’s problematic that more and more war-making power has been put in the hands of the President to the exclusion of Congress, President Obama also adopts the position that he possesses unilateral constitutional authority to act in this case. We haven’t yet seen the underlying legal opinion and analysis, but Jack has pointed out here that in asserting the authority to act independently the Obama administration may be extending, not pulling back on, previous OLC reasoning about presidential power to use force. My third question is about effectiveness. I agree that as a general matter “America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together,” but which is better for the strategic goal Obama lays out here of deterring future chemical weapon use through limited strikes: a more congressionally constrained presidential power or a more flexible one? A President with broad unilateral authority, or a system of strong, formal constitutional checks? I’ve been thinking and writing recently about the relationship between constitutional allocation of war powers and strategies of deterrence or coercive diplomacy, and I believe that even without formally voting to authorize force or not, Congress plays an important role in politically constraining the President and in signaling abroad – to adversaries and allies alike – about our policy preferences and resolve. Part of what worries me about the President’s current approach is that even if the President can win a congressional vote to strike Syria in this instance, the debate so far has shown weak congressional commitment to a global chemical-weapons policing policy – which is what the President claims is important to U.S. security interests (“As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them”).

#### This interpretation of executive authority is part and parcel with orientalism. The executive relies on advisers to affirm discourses that continue to produce the violence of the status quo

Kbiri 8 (Hamid, Major in the Royal Moroccan Air Force, http://www.scribd.com/doc/12070695/The-Influence-of-Orientalism-on-American-Perceptions-and-Policies-in-the-MiddleEast)

More recently, Orientalist expertise has loomed large in the initiation and conduct of OIF. As Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, paid a glowing tribute to the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis, via video phone at a special ceremony held in Tel Aviv to honor Lewis in March 2002: “Bernard has taught [us] how to understand the complex and important history of the Middle-East and use it to guide us where we will go next to build a better world for generations”165 Even before the 9/11 tragedy occurred, Lewis actively lobbied for war in Iraq in a collective open letter addressed to President Clinton in 1998.166 Lewis is actually the father of what the Wall Street journal calls the “Lewis Doctrine”167 which consists of “making Iraq a Westernized polity, reconstituted and imposed from above like Kemal’s Turkey, which is to become a bulwark of security for America and a model for the region.”168 He also wrote an article for Newsweek International in early 2003, in which he made a case for American intervention in Iraq and argued that “worries about Iraqi civilians --fighting in the streets, popular resistance-- were overblown.”169 Other Orientalists whose expertise has turned out misplaced, if not misleading, are Fouad Ajami and Kanan Makiya, who along with Bernard Lewis advised the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq war.170 Downplaying the risks of insurgency in post-Saddam era, they argued that the Iraqis were going to meet American troops “with flowers and sweets.”171 The remarks of Vice President Dick Cheney to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention are very telling in this regard: As for the reaction of the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle-East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’ Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart.172 But most disturbing of all are the words of Bernard Lewis, hailed as the Dean of the Orientalists, as he counseled the Vice President and Secretary of Defense on the coming war in Iraq: “I believe that one of the things you’ve got to do to Arabs is hit them between the eyes with a big stick. They respect power.”173 Apart from the racist tones of these remarks, they reflect a long-standing Orientalist bias which consists of “underestimating the locals. ”174 Such remarks seem to highlight, at best, a lack of scientific neutrality and distance between the intellectual and his subject. They also somehow give credence to the reproaches made by Lewis’ detractors that although his work “purports to be liberal objective scholarship, it is in reality very close to being propaganda against his subject material”175 Last but not least, during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, Bernard Lewis went so far as to warn, in the Wall Street Journal, that Teheran might drop a nuclear bomb—a bomb that Iran by all accounts did not have—on Israel on August 22, 2006, coinciding with the day that the prophet Muhammad went to Jerusalem and then to heaven.176 In his own words: “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinajad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for August 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.”177 Orientalists definitely seem to think that their stature as renowned scholars would lend unlimited authority to their pronouncements on contemporary conflicts in the Middle-East and the Muslim world, even when they clearly go against common sense.

#### Complicity with the unchecked executive authority ensures that this preemptive mentality continues unabated

Bacevich, 2007 (Andrew, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, “Rescinding the Bush Doctrine”, Boston News, March 1, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial\_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/01/rescinding\_the\_bush\_doctrine/)

RATHER THAN vainly sniping at President Bush over his management of the Iraq war, the Democratic-controlled Congress ought to focus on averting any recurrence of this misadventure. Decrying the so-called "surge" or curbing the president's authority to conduct ongoing operations will contribute little to that end. Legislative action to foreswear preventive war might contribute quite a lot. Long viewed as immoral, illicit, and imprudent, preventive war -- attacking to keep an adversary from someday posing a danger -- became the centerpiece of US national security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. President Bush unveiled this new strategy in a speech at West Point in June 2002. "If we wait for threats to fully materialize," he said, "we will have waited too long." The new imperative was to strike before threats could form. Bush declared it the policy of the United States to "impose preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses." Although the Constitution endows the legislative branch with the sole authority to declare war, the president did not consult Congress before announcing his new policy. He promulgated the Bush Doctrine by fiat. Then he acted on it. In 2003, Saddam Hussein posed no immediate threat to the United States; arguing that he might one day do so, the administration depicted the invasion of Iraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense. To their everlasting shame, a majority of members in both the House and the Senate went along, passing a resolution that "authorized" the president to do what he was clearly intent on doing anyway. Implicitly, the Bush Doctrine received congressional endorsement. Events since have affirmed the wisdom of seeing preventive war as immoral, illicit, and imprudent. The Bush administration expected a quick, economical, and decisive victory in Iraq. Advertising the war as an effort to topple a brutal dictator and liberate an oppressed people, it no doubt counted on battlefield success to endow the enterprise with a certain ex post facto legitimacy. Elated Iraqis showering American soldiers with flowers and candies would silence critics who condemned the war as morally unjustified and patently illegal. None of these expectations has come to pass. In its trial run, the Bush Doctrine has been found wanting. Today, Iraq teeters on the brink of disintegration. The war's costs, already staggering, continue to mount. Violence triggered by the US invasion has killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. We cannot fully absolve ourselves of responsibility for those deaths. Our folly has alienated friends and emboldened enemies. Rather than nipping in the bud an ostensibly emerging threat, the Iraq war has diverted attention from existing dangers (such as Al Qaeda) while encouraging potential adversaries (like Iran) to see us as weak. The remedy to this catastrophic failure lies not in having another go -- a preventive attack against Iran, for example -- but in acknowledging that the Bush Doctrine is inherently pernicious. Our reckless flirtation with preventive war qualifies as not only wrong, but also stupid. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine poses a greater danger to the United States than do the perils it supposedly guards against. We urgently need to abrogate that doctrine in favor of principles that reflect our true interests and our professed moral values. Here lies an opportunity for Congress to make a difference. The fifth anniversary of President Bush's West Point speech approaches. Prior to that date, Democratic leaders should offer a binding resolution that makes the following three points: First, the United States categorically renounces preventive war. Second, the United States will henceforth consider armed force to be an instrument of last resort. Third, except in response to a direct attack on the United States, any future use of force will require prior Congressional authorization, as required by the Constitution. The legislation should state plainly our determination to defend ourselves and our allies. But it should indicate no less plainly that the United States no longer claims the prerogative of using "preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses." Declaring the Bush Doctrine defunct will not solve the problems posed by Iraq, but it will reduce the likelihood that we will see more Iraqs in our future. By taking such action, Congress will restore its relevance, its badly tarnished honor, and its standing in the eyes of the American people.

#### Therefore, Colin and I affirm that the President of the United States should not have the authority to initiate armed forces into hostilities to prevent proliferation.

#### Irrational bodies are built into prolif discourse, where “soft paths” for racism solidify into policy and affirm larger “patterns” that sustain deprivation and abandonment of the developing world – plan rearranges the institutional source of binary, exposing both of the lay of the land and thus revolutionary potential

Gusterson, 2004 [Hugh, People of the Bomb, p 25-27]

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.17 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) na­tions as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said. Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contempo­rary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child na­tions lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines such as *National Geographic."* I want to suggest here that an­other variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.Following Anthony Giddens in his *Central Problems in Social Theory*, I define ideology as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior that (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nu­clear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear pow­ers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of dep­rivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north- south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.In the following pages I examine four popular arguments against hori­zontal nuclear proliferation and suggest that all four are ideological and ori­entalist. The arguments are that (1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nu­clear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Each of these four arguments could as easily be turned backward and used to delegitimate Western nuclear weapons, as I show in the following commentary. Sometimes, in the specialized literature of defense experts, one finds frank discussion of near accidents, weaknesses, and anomalies in deterrence as it has been practiced by the established nuclear powers, but these admissions tend to be quarantined in specialized discursive spaces where the general public has little access to them and where it is hard to connect them to the broader public discourse on nuclear proliferation." In this chapter I retrieve some of these discussions of flaws in deterrence from their quarantined spaces and juxtapose them with the dominant discourse on the dangers of proliferation in order to destabilize its foundational as­sumption of a secure binary distinction between "the West" and "the Third World." It is my argument that, in the production of this binary distinc­tion, possible fears and ambivalences about Western nuclear weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of the Other. This purging and recasting occurs in a discourse characterized by gaps and silences in its representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its repre­sentation of those of the Other. Our discourse on proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies. I should clarify two points here. First, I am not arguing that there are, finally, no differences between countries in terms of their reliability as custo­dians of nuclear weapons. I am arguing that those differences are complex, ambiguous, and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple bi­nary division between, on the one hand, a few countries that have nuclear weapons and insist they are safe and, on the other hand, those countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are told they cannot safely acquire them. It is my goal here to demonstrate the ways in which this simple binary distinction works as an ideological mechanism to impede a more nuanced and realistic assessment of the polymorphous dangers posed by nuclear weapons in all countries and to obscure recognition of the ways in which our own policies in the West have often exacerbated dangers in the Third World that, far from being simply the problems of the Other, are problems produced by a world system dominated by First World institu­tions and states.

#### This ideology displays itself in counter-prolif policy – the United States is able to pursue its global nuclear agenda by simply preventing the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing tech

Mueller, 2008 (John, Dept of Political Science at Ohio State University, “The Costs and Consequences of Efforts to Prevent Proliferation”, July 16, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//apsa08.pdf)

The nonproliferation focus has also exacerbated the nuclear waste problem in the United States. In the late 1970s, the Carter administration banned the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, something that radically reduces the amount of nuclear waste, under the highly questionable assumption that this policy would reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation. Nonproliferation efforts worldwide also hamper worldwide economic development by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy--sometimes even making them prohibitive for some countries. As countries grow, they require ever increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity--or increases its price--effectively slows economic growth and essentially kills people by reducing the gains in life expectancy commonly afforded by economic development. The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically guarantees to signing nonnuclear countries "the fullest possible exchange of technology" for the development of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard Betts points out, this rationale has been undermined by the development of a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium," thereby reducing the NPT to "a simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so."49 More broadly the nonproliferation quest has from time to time boosted international oil prices to the detriment of almost all the countries in the world except for the potential proliferator. Because nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases, it is an obvious potential candidate for helping with the problem of global warming, an issue many people hold to be of the highest concern for the future of the planet.

#### This prolif dilemma underlies all nuclear energy development – Posturing is the key factor in preventing the global spread of nuclear energy

Squassoni, 2009 (Sharon, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace focusing on nuclear nonproliferation and national security, “Nuclear Power: How Much More?” Nuclear Policy Education Center, March 25, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=176&rid=2)

The amount of nuclear capacity required to make a signification contribution to global climate change mitigation is so large that it would inevitably be widely distributed across the globe. Such a distribution would have particular implications for nuclear proliferation. However, projected distributions of nuclear energy out to 2050 are extremely speculative. The industry itself does not engage in such projections, and countries that set nuclear energy production goals have a history of widely missing long-range targets, such as China and India. The discussion below considers a hypothetical distribution of nuclear energy for 2050, based on the 2003 MIT Study. [12] Scenario III, shown in Figure 7, uses the “High 2050” scenario in Appendix 2 (“Global Electricity Demand and the Nuclear Power Growth Scenario”) of the 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power. Although this is not a distribution designed to achieve optimal CO2 reductions, it is expansion at a level significant enough (1500 GWe) to have an effect on CO2 emissions. This would mean a fourfold increase from current reactor capacity. The MIT study used an underlying assumption that the developed countries would continue with a modest annual increase in per capita electricity use and the developing countries would move to the 4000 kWh per person per year benchmark if at all feasible (the 4000 kWh benchmark being the dividing line between developed and advanced countries). Electricity demand was then pegged to estimated population growth. Finally, it was assumed that nuclear energy would retain or increase its current share of electricity generation. The least-off developing countries were assumed in the MIT study not to have the wherewithal for nuclear energy. It should be noted that MIT’s 2050 projection was “an attempt to understand what the distribution of nuclear power deployment would be if robust growth were realized, perhaps driven by a broad commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and a concurrent resolution of the various challenges confronting nuclear power’s acceptance in various countries.” A few countries that the MIT High 2050 case included but are not included here are countries that currently have laws restricting nuclear energy, such as Austria. Implications for Uranium Enrichment A fourfold expansion of nuclear energy would entail significant new production requirements for uranium enrichment as shown in Figure 8 and possibly, reprocessing. The MIT study anticipated that 54 states would have reactor capacities that could possibly justify indigenous uranium enrichment. If a capability of 10 GWe is considered the threshold at which indigenous enrichment becomes cost-effective, more than 15 additional states could find it advantageous to engage in uranium enrichment. Figure 9 depicts what the geographic distribution of enrichment capacity might look like, based on the development of 10 GWe or more of reactor capacity. Of course, some states – such as Australia or Kazakhstan – might opt to enrich uranium regardless of domestic nuclear energy capacity, choosing to add value to their own uranium exports. In addition, states may choose to take the path of the UAE, which has formally renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its domestic law, despite aspiring to reach 10 GWe of capacity. Ultimately, these decisions lie very much in the political realm, and can be reversed. Implications for Proliferation Proliferation experts generally fall into two camps – those that do not consider power reactors a cause for proliferation concern but focus on the sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and those that are concerned about the entire fuel cycle. Advocates of nuclear energy point out that most states that have developed nuclear weapons have used dedicated production or research reactors rather than power reactors to produce their fissile material [13]; others point to the potential for a state to use peaceful nuclear power to further a clandestine weapons program, either through technology transfer, hiding clandestine activities within a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle or diverting lightly irradiated fuel to be further enriched. Regardless of one’s views on the proliferation risks of power reactors, the recent surge of enthusiasm for nuclear energy poses several proliferation risks. First, recent enthusiasm is not limited just to power reactors. On the enrichment side, President Bush’s 2004 initiative to limit capabilities to current technology holders failed, not just in strategy but also in tactics. For example, Argentina, Canada, and South Africa have all expressed an interest in keeping their enrichment options open. Brazil, which is commissioning a new centrifuge enrichment plant at Resende, will likely produce more low-enriched uranium than is needed for its own consumption by 2015. By and large, these countries do not produce nuclear energy on at scale large enough to make domestic enrichment capability economic. [14] However, they have keen national interests in maintaining their right to enrich. Faced with allied objections to restricting future options, the Bush Administration folded. This is partly the reason for the impasse at the NSG on further detailed criteria restricting enrichment and reprocessing. A perception of the U.S. approach as discriminatory could open the door to further challenges. Even if piecemeal efforts to limit the number of states with uranium-enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing capabilities succeed, these could ultimately further erode the NPT by extending the existence of haves and have-nots from nuclear weapons into the nuclear fuel cycle. In the short term, efforts to limit expansion could slow some states’ implementation of the safeguards-strengthening measures in the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. In the long term, other decisions to strengthen the NPT could be jeopardized. On the reprocessing end, the United States has recently embraced spent fuel reprocessing at home and abroad. From the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to nuclear cooperation with India, Bush administration policies supported reprocessing. This is a complete reversal from the policies adopted in the mid-1970s not to encourage the use of plutonium in the civilian fuel cycle. A nuclear renaissance that embraces reprocessing as necessary to reduce spent fuel accumulation could result in more plutonium in transit, providing more potential targets for diversion. A renaissance that includes widespread installation of fast reactors would similarly increase targets for diversion. Although GNEP advocates stress that the kind of spent fuel “conditioning” they favor would not result in the separation of plutonium, there are few assurances thus far that new techniques are any more proliferation-resistant than PUREX. As opponents like to point out, no future fuel conditioning technique in the United States will be more proliferation resistant than storing spent fuel. And while most countries are probably interested in having someone else solve the problem either of spent fuel storage or high-level waste storage, no commercial reprocessing service currently will store high-level waste. Neither the United States, nor Russia, nor France has committed to taking back spent fuel under GNEP. A further question is whether the next generation of reactors will be more or less proliferation-resistant than existing reactors. As of December 2002, the Generation IV Forum had not yet adopted a standard methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance and physical protection for the six systems under consideration. In addition, there have been a few reports that India is considering exporting its Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors. India may not be the only state in a second tier of suppliers that might be interested in exporting reactors, injecting some uncertainty into assessments. Beyond the technical realm, there are very real political questions about widespread diffusion of civilian nuclear power. Would new nuclear states would raise proliferation concerns by virtue of their geographic location, the existence of terrorist groups on their soil, or other sources of political instability? Would expanded nuclear infrastructure in Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Vietnam, and the GCC countries lead their neighbors to worry about and respond to the possibility that these countries will develop weapons programs? The expansion of nuclear power would also have practical consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additional facilities will place additional safeguards requirements on IAEA inspectors It is unclear how the IAEA will meet these requirements – will these mean more inspection days or will other approaches be used under the “integrated safeguards” program? Although reactors themselves require relatively few inspection days, there will be significant work in helping prepare new nuclear states for nuclear power programs. Already, the IAEA has conducted workshops on infrastructure requirements, including energy needs and planning considerations; nuclear security and safeguards; physical infrastructure; current and future reactor technology; experience in developing nuclear programs; human resource requirements; and public perceptions. States must also develop their states systems of accounting and control. A nuclear expansion, in particular, that results in more states with bulk-handling facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) could place significant strain on the IAEA and the inspections system. Recent experience suggest that current methods of inspection cannot provide timely detection. The fact that the IAEA’s goals for timely detection are clearly longer than material conversion times – that is, the time it would take for a proliferator to produce finished metal shapes – is a big concern. The largest enrichment and reprocessing plants under safeguards now are under EURATOM safeguards; the IAEA’s role in verifying material balances in those plants is limited by the IAEA-EURATOM agreement. The only experience in safeguarding commercial-scale enrichment and reprocessing plants outside of EURATOM in a non-nuclear-weapon state is in Japan, where incidents with significant material losses have raised questions. British commercial reprocessing at the THORP facility also has produced recurring reports of significant materials losses. Perhaps the largest question about a nuclear expansion is whether or not planned technological developments will outpace nonproliferation initiatives, such as fuel supply assurances and multinational fuel-cycle centers, voluntary export guidelines, and further restrictions within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Criticism of the U.S. GNEP program had been aimed in part at the aggressive timeline for technology demonstration of advanced reprocessing, in contrast to developments more closely tied to nonproliferation objectives, such as supporting more proliferation-resistant reactors with sealed fuel cores that would limit handling of fuel. Already, efforts to manage expansion of the front and back ends of the fuel cycle, whether nuclear fuel assurances, fuel banks, or fuel leasing projects, have abandoned any concepts of formal restraints in favor of incentives. It is too soon to tell how compelling those incentives will be. Finally, although there is disagreement among experts about the proliferation potential of light water reactors, it is clear that the proliferation potential of a country with no nuclear expertise is lower than that of a country with nuclear power and its associated infrastructure. The current encouraging climate for nuclear energy – new cooperation agreements between France and the UAE, Libya and Algeria, and between the United States and Turkey and Jordan, for a few – suggests that regardless of global climate change concerns, or whether or not a significant expansion occurs, some states in the Middle East will develop nuclear energy. It is not clear whether new nuclear reactors in the Middle East would result in new enrichment or reprocessing plants in the Middle East. In part, much depends on the outcome of negotiations with Iran on its enrichment capabilities. If states clearly renounce making nuclear fuel and allow sufficient wide- ranging inspections to verify such pledges, the proliferation implications could be significantly diminished. The hope is that this can be accomplished with the UAE.

#### Global Warming is happening –humans are the primary cause.

Muller 7-28-2012 [Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.

#### CO2 emissions are the driving force

Vertessy and Clark3-13**-**2012[Rob, Acting Director of Australian Bureau of Meteorology, and Megan, Chief Executive Officer at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, “State of the Climate 2012”, <http://theconversation.edu.au/state-of-the-climate-2012-5831>]

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions account for about 60% of the effect from anthropogenic greenhouse gases on the earth’s energy balance over the past 250 years. These global CO2 emissions are mostly from fossil fuels (more than 85%), land use change, mainly associated with tropical deforestation (less than 10%), and cement production and other industrial processes (about 4%). Australia contributes about 1.3% of the global CO2 emissions. Energy generation continues to climb and is dominated by fossil fuels – suggesting emissions will grow for some time yet. CO2 levels are rising in the atmosphere and ocean. About 50% of the amount of CO2 emitted from fossil fuels, industry, and changes in land-use, stays in the atmosphere. The remainder is taken up by the ocean and land vegetation, in roughly equal parts. The extra carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans is estimated to have caused about a 30% increase in the level of ocean acidity since pre-industrial times. The sources of the CO2 increase in the atmosphere can be identified from studies of the isotopic composition of atmospheric CO2 and from oxygen (O2) concentration trends in the atmosphere. The observed trends in the isotopic (13C, 14C) composition of CO2 in the atmosphere and the decrease in the concentration of atmospheric O2 confirm that the dominant cause of the observed CO2 increase is the combustion of fossil fuels.

#### Global warming destroys global biodiversity – it makes biome shifts impossible because of the rate at which climate change occurs

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn\_Down\_the\_heat\_Why\_a\_4\_degree\_centrigrade\_warmer\_world\_must\_be\_avoided.pdf)

Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. These include water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on ecosystems and their services found the following: • If greenhouse gas emissions and other stresses continue at or above current rates, the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. • Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases in global average temperature exceed of 2–3° above preindustrial levels. • For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3° above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, major changes are projected in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological interactions and shifts in species’ geographical ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale losses of global ecosystems and species extinctions have been associated with rapid climate change combined with other ecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates of extinction because of human pressures over the last century or more, which have intensified in recent decades, have contributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well established that loss or degradation of ecosystem services occurs as a consequence of species extinctions, declining species abundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. This section outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tends to confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that there remain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur in biological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most model projections agree on major adverse consequences for biodiversity in a 4°C world (Bellard et al., 2012). With high levels of warming, coalescing human induced stresses on ecosystems have the potential to trigger large-scale ecosystem collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in the projections, there is a risk not only of major loss of valuable ecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the most vulnerable who depend on them, but also of feedbacks being initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of global warming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4°C. In a scenario of 2.5°C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbon and water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, & Lucht, 2011). If warming is limited to less than 2°C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biome shifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for cold and tropical climates already at 3°C of warming. At greater than 4°C of warming, biomes in temperate zones will also be substantially affected. These changes would impact not only the human and animal communities that directly rely on the ecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, ranging from extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services such as fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to be particularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek, 2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature and precipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of extreme events. These climatic variables are thus decisive factors in determining plant structure and ecosystem composition (Reu et al., 2011). Increasing vulnerability to heat and drought stress will likely lead to increased mortality and species extinction. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortality in Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions between phenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has the potential to facilitate the spread and establishment of invasive species (pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, & Dukes, 2008; Rahel & Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystem services and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to further exacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee & Jetz, 2008). Ecosystems will be affected by the increased occurrence of extremes such as forest loss resulting from droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change also has the potential to catalyze rapid shifts in ecosystems such as sudden forest loss or regional loss of agricultural productivity resulting from desertification (Barnosky et al., 2012). The predicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault and Brown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to have immediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change induced shifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting in considerable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It is anticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th century observations and 21st century projections, poleward latitudinal biome shifts of up to 400 km are possible in a 4° C world (Gonzalez et al., 2010). In the case of mountaintop ecosystems, for example, such a shift is not necessarily possible, putting them at particular risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species that dwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands would face a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof, Levinsky, Araújo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, driven by climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in both reduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillips et al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197 African plant species studied, 25–42 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should be emphasized that competition for space with human agriculture over the coming century is likely to prevent vegetation expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Species composition changes can lead to structural changes of the entire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests (Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants in temperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), putting grass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of food available—this is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction for herbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback, owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4 grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystems themselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differences in projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought (Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas of North American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stress leading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zones between boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, is corroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), as well as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changes within forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholze et al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree species diversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size [see Figure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011)], while at 2°C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climate suitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than the tropical Americas. However, even at 2°C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At 4°C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to 30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al., 2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a much drier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possible planetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.5–4.5°C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber, 2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a range of factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on water use efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency and intensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem services such as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remain quite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a major basin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of an abrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fire occurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming of approximately 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected to be even higher in a 4°C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increase the incidence of fire (Aragão et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation (Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests may therefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating this risk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations is accounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to be preserved in the 2°C case, compared to just under half in the 4°C warming case (see Figure 5 in Zelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar & Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed a number of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climate is more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon being most at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical forests to seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.5–3.5°C when CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.5–5.5°C when it is considered. It is important to note, as Salazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact with the climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems. Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long, 2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such as the Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-land ecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced ‘greening’ would, however, negatively affect biodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands and savannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45 percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species in southern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularly vulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmospheric CO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise can cause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots (Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected to experience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al., 2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitable climate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-relief islands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers are lacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting from deforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not be the biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful in the longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs are acutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results from absorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reduction of available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, a critical reef-building process (De’ath, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coral reefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50 percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasing water temperatures (De’ath et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to a warming of 4°C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs as “crumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals” (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency of bleaching events under global warming in even a 2°C world has been projected to exceed the ability of coral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystems and the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fished species, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependent coastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4°C world is reached. The preceding discussion reviewed the implications of a 4°C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems are composed ultimately of the species and interactions between them and their physical environment. Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it is broadly agreed that there exists a strong link between this biological diversity and ecosystem productivity, stability and functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector, 1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effects on the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services to human societies. It is the overall diversity of species that ultimately characterizes the biodiversity and evolutionary legacy of life on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, species extinction rates are now at very high levels compared to the geological record. Loss of those species presently classified as ‘critically endangered’ would lead to mass extinction on a scale that has happened only five times before in the last 540 million years. The loss of those species classified as ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’ would confirm this loss as the sixth mass extinction episode (Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale, Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram & Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, while devising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climate change is likely to result in some bio-climates disappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents, with new, or novel, climates developing in the tropics and subtropics (Williams, Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where 21st century projected climates do not overlap with their 20th century analogues, and disappearing climates are those 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21st century projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a 4°C world (SRES A2), 12–39 percent of the Earth’s land surface may experience a novel climate compared to 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult because researchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise to disruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under the same scenario an estimated 10–48 percent of the Earth’s surface including highly biodiverse regions such as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. With limitations on how fast species can disperse, or move, this indicates that many species may find themselves without a suitable climate space and thus face a high risk of extinction. Globally, as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. Limiting warming to lower levels in this study showed substantially reduced effects, with the magnitude of novel and disappearing climates scaling linearly with global mean warming. More recent work by Beaumont and colleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36). Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global 200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 1961–1990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed to substantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on the A2 emission scenario (4.1°C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropical and sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to such extremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their ability to respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes, that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. The overall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of the section, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related human pressures are likely to remain a major and defining driver of loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the coming decades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will the predominance of climate change as a determinant of ecosystem and biodiversity survival. While the factors of human stresses on ecosystems are manifold, in a 4°C world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversity loss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages to ecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (e.g., hydrology—quantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline (loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet as “the perfect storm” with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification and degradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions with planetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing risk that climate change, combined with other human activities, will cause the irreversible transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience (Barnosky et al., 2012).

#### These are not normal debate impacts with loose internal chains and low probabilities. Global Warming has effects across countries, classes and populations. The effects of CO2 will be felt disproportionately by minority bodies.

Mandell 2008 [Bekah, A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Boston College Law School; Director of the Champlain Valley Office of Economic Opportunity Fair Housing Project, “Racial Reification and Global Warming: A Truly Inconvenient Truth,” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 3, 4-1-2008, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=twlj> ]

We are facing a global climate crisis. The release of the 2007 U.N. ¶ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report eliminates any ¶ legitimate doubt that human activities have caused carbon dioxide ¶ (CO2) to accumulate in the earth’s atmosphere, dangerously increasing ¶ the earth’s average temperature.1 Already, increasing atmospheric temperatures are having disastrous effects on the earth’s climate.2 Traditional ways of life for indigenous peoples of Alaska face extinction as polar ice caps and permafrost continue to melt, unfreezing seas and ¶ unleashing storm surges that engulf villages and endanger lives.3¶ The rapid changes in northern coastal regions foreshadow the ¶ danger more southern latitudes are just beginning to encounter.4 The ¶ climate crisis also promises to bring more severe weather events to ¶ more heavily populated regions of the world, causing famine and disease in warmer areas.5 The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere ¶ derived from anthropogenic sources has already brought more severe ¶ weather to much of the earth’s most populated areas, illustrated most ¶ famously by the Hurricane Katrina disaster.6¶ However, despite decades of irrefutable evidence about the credibility of the global climate crisis and its anthropogenic causes, climate ¶ change is not a priority for most Americans7. The American public successfully has ignored the increasing ~~visibility~~ of the effects of climate ¶ change for years, developing an attitude of willful ignorance despite the ¶ immediacy of the problem.8 A Gallup poll conducted in 2004 found ¶ that the percentage of Americans who worried a “great deal” or a “fair ¶ amount” about the “greenhouse effect” or “global warming” had decreased from the previous year, with only fifty-one percent of respondents noting that they were concerned about the climate crisis.9 The ¶ other half of those surveyed reported that they worried “only a little” or ¶ “not at all” about global warming or the greenhouse effect.10 This public attitude towards global warming legitimates inaction from the gov- ernment and the private sector, as businesses and even national environmental non-profits have generally failed to make it an issue.11¶

#### Challenging the way elites defer to market-based solutions reveals the legal and social premises of hierarchies that sustain white privilege – the aff policy design resuscitates discussion of global warming policy that acknowledges whiteness as part of the problem

Mandell 2008 [Bekah, A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Boston College Law School; Director of the Champlain Valley Office of Economic Opportunity Fair Housing Project, “Racial Reification and Global Warming: A Truly Inconvenient Truth,” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 3, 4-1-2008, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=twlj> ]

Fear of eroding the hierarchies that define race explains why politicians and other elites have consistently championed ineffectual “market-based approaches” to global warming.36 By focusing public and private energy on relatively insignificant individual behavior changes, the ¶ Bush administration and other privileged elites are able to maintain the ¶ racial hierarchy that consolidates their economic and social power.37¶ Politicians know that “[w]ithout white-over-black the state withers ¶ away.”38 Therefore, they have a profound incentive to maintain the racial hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, “because th[ese elites] accrue social and ¶ economic benefits by maintaining the status quo, they inevitably do.”39¶ This white consensus to maintain the spatial and mobility hierarchies ¶ that reify race is possible because, “[w]hite privilege thrives in highly ¶ racialized societies that espouse racial equality, but in which whites will ¶ not tolerate being either inconvenienced in order to achieve racial ¶ equality . . . or being denied the full benefits of their whiteness . . . .”40¶ With so much white privilege to lose, it becomes clear why even most ¶ passionate environmental advocates are far more willing to call for, and ¶ make, small non-structural changes in their behavior to ameliorate global warming, but are unwilling to embrace significant or meaningful ¶ actions to address the crisis.41¶ Even as global warming is starting to become the subject of increasing media coverage and as more environmental groups call for ¶ action to halt the crisis, most activism is limited to changes that maintain the existing spatial, social, economic and legal framework that defines American society.42 Despite knowing for decades that we have ¶ been living unsustainable lifestyles, and “hav[ing] had some intuition ¶ that it was a binge and the earth couldn’t support it, . . . aside from the ¶ easy things (biodegradable detergent, slightly smaller cars) we didn’t ¶ do much. We didn’t turn our lives around to prevent it.”43¶ Greenhouse emissions reduction challenges have cropped up on ¶ websites across the country, encouraging Americans to change their ¶ light bulbs, inflate their tires to the proper tire pressure to ensure optimal gas mileage, switch to hybrid cars, run dishwashers only when full, ¶ telecommute, or buy more efficient washers and dryers.44 However, ¶ popular emissions challenge web sites are not suggesting that Americans give up their cars, move into smaller homes in more densely populated urban neighborhoods near public transportation, or take other ¶ substantive actions to mitigate the global climate crisis.45 Even Al Gore the most famous voice in the climate change movement, reminds his ¶ fellow Americans that “[l]ittle things matter . . . buy a hybrid if you can, ¶ buy a flex-fuel car if you can. Get a higher mileage car that’s comfortable for your needs.”46 “[M]any yuppie progressive ‘greens’ are the ones who drove their SUVs to environmental rallies and, even worse, ¶ made their homes at the far exurban fringe, requiring massive car dependence in their daily lives,” taking residential segregation and racial ¶ and spacial hierarchies to previously unimagined dimensions.47 This ¶ focus on maintaining one’s privileged lifestyle while making minimal ¶ changes reflects the power of the underlying structural impediments ¶ blocking a comprehensive response to global climate change in the ¶ United States.48¶ It is not just political inaction that prevents a meaningful response. ¶ Millions of Americans do not demand a change in environmental policy because, just as with political elites, it is against the interests of those ¶ enjoying white privilege to take genuine ~~steps~~ to combat climate ¶ change.49 Real climate action would ultimately require relinquishing ¶ the spatial, social, and economic markers that have created and protected whiteness and the privilege it confers.50 Although “we too often ¶ fail to appreciate how important race remains as a system for amassing ¶ and defending wealth and privilege,” the painfully slow reaction of the ¶ American public to the growing dangers of global warming highlights ¶ just how important racial privilege remains and how reluctant its beneficiaries are to give it up.51 Elite reformists make meaningful change ¶ even more remote as they push for behaviors to tweak, but not to ¶ change the existing social, economic, and legal hierarchy in the face of “problems, [like global warming] that arise to threaten the predominance of the traditionalist, capitalist ruling class.”52

#### We posit ourselves as committed individuals - we must focus on struggling towards analyzes both the personal and systematic processes of domination and oppression – this academic inquiry resists the hegemonic structures of whiteness

Gustavo E. Fischman, He actively collaborates on projects in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, and he is the author of several books and numerous articles on critical pedagogies, teacher education, and gender issues in education. 2005

[http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/2005,+McLaren+and+Fischman,+Gramsci,+Freire,+Organic+Intellectuals](http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/2005%2C%2BMcLaren%2Band%2BFischman%2C%2BGramsci%2C%2BFreire%2C%2BOrganic%2BIntellectuals) “McClaren and Fischman, Gramsci, Freire, Organic Intellectuals” accessed 10/6/2008

We wish to expand on the role of the organic intellectual by suggesting that the resisting, hegemonized, and fragmented subaltern needs to function not as a critically superconscious “organic intellectual” but as a committed one (Fischman, 1998). The committed intellectual is sometimes critically self conscious and actively engaged but at other times is confused or even unaware of his or her limitations or capacities to be an active proponent of social change. Or as Paulo Freire (1989) has noted, “conscientization is not exactly the starting point of commitment. Conscientization is more of a product of commitment. I do not have to be already critically self-conscious in order to struggle. By struggling I become conscious/aware” (p. 46). Critical consciousness always implies that the subject has some awareness of the immediate world that concerns him or her. As Freire (1989) came to recognize, a deep understanding of the complex processes of oppression and domination is not enough to guarantee personal or collective praxis. What must serve as the genesis of such an understanding is an unwavering commitment to the struggle against injustice. Only by developing an understanding that is born of a commitment to social justice can such an understanding lead to the type of conscientization necessary to challenge the hegemonic structures of domination and exploitation. The globalization of capital can be challenged and even defeated not simply by understanding its formation and dissembling operations but also by developing the will and the courage—the commitment—to struggle against it.

#### The affirmation of the topic engages in a process of inverse double consciousness- to recognize the construction of American society (and thus the self) from the position of the oppressed. This makes complicity in the machinery of whiteness explicit and lays the foundation for the recognition of the autonomy of others and works towards decolonizing the white mind and structures of racist oppression.

Martinot 2010

[Steve, Adjunct Professor San Francisco State University*,The Machinery of Whiteness: Studies in the Structure of Racialization*, Temple University Press, 2010, pg 185-186, modified for ableist language]

Perhaps, as an alternative to trying to construct an anti-racist whiteness, a fi rst ~~step~~ toward decolonizing the United States, and the white mind, and ~~weakening~~ its cultural structures of racialization can be made by adopting an inverse form of DuBoisian double consciousness. DuBois theorized the notion of a double consciousness as the condition under which black people found themselves. For him, it meant always ~~seeing~~ oneself through the eyes of others. A black person was both excluded from being American by being black and striving to transcend the white-imposed mark of being black in order to be American. Each black person is judged in advance by those other ~~eyes~~, and always already rendered guilty in both the white ~~gaze~~ and one’s own interiorization of it. Yet one remains guilty of nothing more than having been ~~seen~~, of having been noticed because rendered noticeable by the other’s racialization of oneself. That is, a black person is noticed by whites because of something whites do to themselves, through which the black person is then ~~seen~~, and oppressed by being ~~seen~~ and socially categorized by the whites’ act of noticing. A reverse double consciousness for whites, as a ~~step~~ toward a decolonizing anti-racism, would be to ~~see~~ [recognize] themselves as they are ~~seen~~ [understood] by the oppressed, by those they racialize. The dominant tend to ~~see~~ [recognize] themselves as the norm, as simply human. Thus, a double consciousness would entail ~~seeing~~ [recognizing] themselves not as the norm but rather as the oppressors that they are in the eyes of those they oppress and racialize. It would be to see their hegemony, their dominance, their pretense to privilege through the eyes of those who suffer from it. This is not a question of guilt, but rather of ~~seeing~~ who one is, and who one is made to be, by one’s position, one’s role, and one’s complicity in the machinery of whiteness. Three things would happen. First, for a person to ~~see~~ [recognize] himself as he or she is ~~seen~~ [understood] by another would be to grant that other person a subjectivity, an autonomy of consciousness that is denied to that other by racism and white supremacy. One would have to ~~see~~ oneself as judged by that other, not as an individual but as a part of a social machine. Part of the purpose of the vilifi cation of the victims of racist violence is to de-authorize the racialized from rendering such judgments. Second, since white identity is based on the ability of whiteness to objectify those it racializes for itself, to ~~see~~ [recognize] oneself as ~~seen~~ [understood] by those racialized would dispel both the other’s objectifi cation by one’s white identity and one’s own ability to use them for white identity construction. One’s white identity, which depends on that objectifi cation, would unravel. And third, one would become an object (in one’s own mind) because one had become an object for those others. But one would become an object whose nature, in its capacity or potentiality to dominate, would be ~~seen~~ [understood] as other, as objectifi ed, by oneself. One could ~~see~~ [recognize] the dehumanization one had imposed on others in oneself. One could then ~~see~~ [recognize] the modes by which one dominates or oppresses simply by being white, because ~~seen~~ as such by those whom whites have racialized. It might be a place to start.

#### Roleplaying relies on a false idea that the government always makes unitary decisions – this creates a bad model of education that nullifies our ability to create real change

Claude 1988(Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–

alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

## 2AC

### Lifecycle

**Net-reduction in emissions – robust evidence**

**NREL ‘12** (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Nuclear Power Results – Life Cycle Assessment Harmonization”, Updated May 4, 2012, retrieved Sept 3, 2012, <http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/sustain_lca_nuclear.html>, CMR)

Collectively, life cycle assessment literature shows that nuclear power is similar to other renewable and much lower than fossil fuel in total lifecycle GHG emissions. In addition, the harmonization process increased the precision of lifecycle GHG estimates in the literature while having little impact on the overall central tendency.¶ Harmonization Impact on Variability and Central Tendency¶ Overall, harmonizing for all parameters (capacity factor, thermal efficiency, system lifetime, system boundary and GWPs) resulted in a tighter distribution than the published GHG emissions estimates for nuclear power systems. The total range of the data was decreased by 50% and the interquartile range was decreased by 35%.¶ Of the values harmonized, adjusting reported data to a consistent system operating lifetime had the greatest impact on reducing variability in the estimated life cycle GHG emissions from nuclear power systems.¶ Harmonization reduced the central tendency of GHG emissions estimates for nuclear power systems by 8%.¶ Comparison of Harmonization Impacts on Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor Technologies¶ For more information, visit:¶ IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Renewable Energy in the Context of Sustainable DevelopmentPDF¶ Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Nuclear Electricity Generation: Systematic Review and Harmonization (journal article)¶ OpenEI: Data, Visualization, and Bibliographies¶ Assuming consistent performance characteristics, the median LC GHG emissions estimates were nearly identical for PWR and BWR technologies after harmonization. The median life cycle GHG emission estimates for PWR and BWR technology types are 14 and 21 g CO2eq/kWh, respectively, as published, and 12 and 13 g CO2eq/kWh, respectively after harmonization.¶ To understand additional sources of variability in reported results, categorization and comparison of results based on life cycle assessment method, GHG emission intensity of primary source energy mix GHG emission intensity, uranium enrichment method and uranium ore grade was also conducted.¶ Given the large number of previously published life cycle GHG emission estimates of nuclear power systems and their narrow distribution, post-harmonization, it is unlikely that new LCAs with the same system boundaries of similar nuclear LWR power technologies will differ greatly.

### Waste

#### Waste isn’t a serious problem -- it can be easily dealt with.

Heaberlin, ‘4

[Scott W., Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, “A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity”]

The other thing about these very long-lived isotopes is there isn't very much of them to start with. We will get into total waste volumes in a minute, but it is worthwhile here to capture some sense of just how small the long-lived fraction really is. While it will vary a bit with the particular reactor and how you run it, for each metric ton of spent fuel you will get about 890 grams of technetium-99 and 190 grams of iodine-129. As we will see in a bit, if all the reactors in the United States get their licenses extended and run a full 60 years, we will get about 105,000 metric tons of spent fuel. That means 20% of all the electric power for the entire United States for 60 years would give you 93 metric tons of technetium-99 and 20 metric tons of iodine-129. Isn't that a lot? ¶ The density of technetium metal is 11.5 grams per cubic centimeter, and solid iodine has a density of 4.9 gram per cubic centimeter. That means the 93 tons of technetium would fit in a cube just under 2 meters, about 6.5 feet on a side. The iodine-129 would be a bit smaller at 1.6 meters or 5.2 feet on a side. That is it. I have seen walk-in closets that would be big enough for both. And remember, this is from all the waste from all the reactors in the United States assuming they all run for 60 full years. ¶ But how radioactive would this pile of iodine-129 and technetium-99 be? ¶ The radiation would be so intense that the thermal heat coming off the combined accumulation would be about 800 watts. That is half a hair dyer. This is the "fission products radioactive for tens of thousands of years" problem, half a hair dryer of energy and a walk-in closet worth of space.

### T

#### We meet – we’ll defend that the president shouldn’t have the authority to preempt proliferation threats – they can say that the president should be able to do that - solves most of their offense

#### Authority comes from statutes – by definition a statutory restriction says that the statute should be restricted

The Law Dictionary, http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/#ixzz2bsSCuBEj)

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION? Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

#### Counter-Interp – Acceptable affirmatives must begin with a call to restrict a statutorily conferred authority of War Powers of the president in one of the topic areas- the question of whether a plan is fiat or a method is debated is open to choice

#### **This is best –**

#### Structural inequalities – status quo policymaking disadvantages minority bodies in favor of maintaining hierarchies of the status quo – this perpetuates structural violence – that’s the Mandel evidence

#### And their framework perpetuates the violence of the status quo

Shaw 04 (Katharine, Associate Professor of Urban Studies at Ohio State Using Feminist Critical Policy Analysis in the Realm of Higher Education: The Case of Welfare Reform as Gendered Educational Policy Source: The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 75, No. 1, Special Issue: Questions of Research and Methodology, (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 56-79

The methods and theoretical frameworks that dominate current policy analysis have been developed and implemented by those in power who, particularly in the world of policy formation and analysis, are overwhelmingly white, male, and well educated. Thus, traditional policy research has, according to Marshall, reflected the assumptions, worldview, and values of this group. As is the case with much mainstream research in the social sciences, traditional policy analysis can be characterized by the following elements. Among the most important are a belief in a single concept of truth (truth with a capital "T"); the assumption that objectivity on the part of the researcher is both achievable and desirable; the assumption that all research subjects share the same relationship to their social environment, thereby rendering such particularities as gender, race, social class, and sexuality unimportant; and the practice of evaluating women on the basis of male norms (Bensimon & Marshall, 1997, p. 7-8). Since this positivist paradigm is so widely accepted in the policy world, it allows policy analysts to assume a dispassionate, objective stance and at the same time encourages the broader policy community to perceive the research enterprise in this way. Thus, traditional policy analysis willfully ignores the inherently political nature of all research, and policy research in particular. As Marshall states, "Traditional policy analysis is grounded in a narrow, falsely objective, overly instrumental view of rationality that masks its latent biases and allows policy elites and technocrats to present analyses and plans as neutral and objective when they are actually tied to prevailing relations of power" (1997a, p. 3).

#### Education – Their interpretation of the United States as an agent that can act with unitary authority creates a bad model for debate – the government doesn’t work that way – it is made up of disparate and often opposing views and rarely knows what to do and then acts on it – Turns all of their education claims and proves the link to the aff – that’s Claude

#### **And, alternatives to roleplaying are critical to effective politics**

Conway and Singh 11 **[**Janet and Jakeet, Professor of Sociology at Brock University and Professor of Political Science at University of Toronto, “Radical Democracy in Global Perspective: notes from the pluriverse,” Third World Quarterly, Vol 32, Iss 4, May]

In order to be attentive to efforts to regenerate local governance on such terms, democracy cannot be reduced to its modern institutional forms. However, the relation between such practices and actually-existing modern institutions, as well as their implications for other possible institutionalisations, cannot be ignored or dismissed. Some see these new social movements as seeking to create new democratic forms and processes in some relationship with existing public institutions, as in the appearance of participatory budgeting processes or the *panchayat* system of village democracy in Kerala.[50](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0050) The uprising in Oaxaca provides one concrete illustration of how this is emerging in practice, as does the Zapatista uprising and the emerging visibility of their autonomous communities and *juntas del buen gobierno*.[51](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0051) In his examination of Bolivian and Brazilian movements Michael Menser views these critical, qualified and limited engagements with actually-existing public institutions as strategies to ‘disarticulate the state’. By this he means ‘a process of fracture plus democratic reterritorialisation outside of the state’, which occurs by ‘first, fracturing the organisational and legitimating apparatus of the state and, second, ‘transferring’ (or reclaiming) particular state functions (eg the budget process, administration of the water utility) from the state to civil society so that these functions can be normatively restructured and managed by a particular social configuration’.[52](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0052) Such engagements with the state are often pragmatic and strategic exploitations of spaces within state-sponsored processes and can coexist with a growing political orientation towards local autonomy—especially when viewed as practices in a period of transition to something new, the contours of which can only barely be discerned. In some cases the ‘new’ politics of autonomy is the reappearance or recuperation in the present of a longstanding alternative tradition that has been rendered invisible or unthinkable through the hegemony of Western-centric modernity. The indigenous land reclamation at Six Nations of the Grand River near Brantford, Canada in 2006, which included a blockade to prevent further incursion by developers on indigenous land, made visible in public discourse the continued existence of a pre-colonial government, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. This form of government runs parallel to the local Band Council, which is widely regarded as a colonial imposition of the Canadian settler state. In the course of the blockade the Confederacy won recognition from the federal government as well as from the Band Council as legitimate representatives of the Six Nations community in negotiations over the land.[53](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0053) For indigenous peoples seeking to reground their communities in their own traditions, the modern state is rarely the central point of reference for their political languages, frameworks and aspirations. Engaging with it is unavoidable in that it is the colonial power, but its modes of politics do not supplant those being reclaimed. Put succinctly, under conditions of coloniality, colonised people have three choices: to be good subjects, compliant in the ways of the modern West; bad subjects, always revolting; or non-subjects, acting in ways removed from the modern West.[54](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0054) In the interests of survival the movements under discussion here seem to be moving in the third direction but they cannot afford to ignore real sedimentations of power and its effects on their lives, spaces and alternative possibilities.[55](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0055) Esteva and Prakash recognise that modern states will probably endure for the foreseeable future. Therefore, strategies that create space to develop new alternative structures of shared authority are essential: [The Zapatista] struggle for a radically democratic governance attempts to take some of the political procedures of formal democracies, while combining these with those prevailing in their own traditions, in their communities … [they] are trying to govern themselves autonomously, well rooted in spaces to which they belong and which belong to them.[56](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0056) Such experimentations are underway in many places, although under the radar of most political theory most of the time. Esteva and Prakash imagine that the functions of modern states could be highly delimited, residual and reserved to those which cannot be fulfilled through reliance on the local commons or local communities. They argue that centralised bodies should be modelled on local bodies, not vice versa.[57](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0057) Parajuli, reflecting on the *panchayat* system of indigenous autonomy in India, similarly imagines a federation of self-managing communities.[58](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0058) Esteva and Prakash strongly differentiate these grassroots initiatives for decentralism from neoliberal discourses of decentralisation, with the former actually seeking greater democratic, transparent and accountable control over their commons and their communities in ways that protect them from the neoliberal market. To do this, they seek also to contain the neoliberal state, ‘constructing from the bottom up mechanisms for delegating limited functions to the state for concerting the harmonious coexistence of local units’.[59](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0059) How do the social majorities create spaces for alternative experimentations and harmonious coexistence? Increasingly the practice of such movements is not to confront states directly but to undermine them by growing the capacities of ecological ethnicities to govern themselves.[60](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0060) It is an open question as to how effective these experimentations will be, and how existing states will respond to these emerging and growing challenges to their sovereignty.

#### **No offense – our interpretation guarantees topic ground and education**

#### They are allowed to say that the president should have authority – the authority good DA is the only guaranteed ground that the resolution guarantees you – no reason you deserve your politics DA

#### The core of the topic is whether the president should have certain authority or not – our interp accesses core topic education – only a risk of our offense

#### **And forcing aff discussions about mechanisms is problematic – it valorizes the law as a neutral site which obfuscates the role of law in generating violence against nonwestern cultures under the guise of exclusivity – hold all Topical version of the aff arguments suspect to this evidence**

Dossa 1999

Shiraz, Department of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, “Liberal Legalism: Law, Culture and Identity,” The European Legacy, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 73-87,1

No discipline in the rationalized arsenal of modernity is as rational, impartial, objective as the province of law and jurisprudence, in the eyes of its liberal enthusiasts. Law is the exemplary countenance of the conscious and calculated rationality of modern life, **it is the** emblematic face of liberal civilization. Law and legal rules symbolize the spirit of science, the march of human progress. As Max Weber, the reluctant liberal theorist of the ethic of rationalization, asserted: judicial formalism enables the legal system to operate like a technically **rational machine**. Thus it guarantees to individuals and groups within the system a relative of maximum of freedom, and greatly increases for them the possibility of predicting the legal consequences of their action. In this reading, law encapsulates the western capacity to bring order to nature and human beings, to turn the ebb and flow of life into a "rational machine" under the tutelage of "judicial formalism".19 Subjugation of the Other races in the colonial empires was motivated by power and rapacity, but it was justified and indeed rationalized, by an appeal to the civilizing influence of religion and law: western Christianity and liberal law. To the imperialist mind, "the civilizing mission of law" was fundamental, though Christianity had a part to play in this program.20 Liberal colonialists visualized law, civilization and progress as deeply connected and basic, they saw western law as neutral, universally relevant and desirable. The first claim was right in the liberal context, the second thoroughly false. In the liberal version, the mythic and irrational, emblems of thoughtlessness and fear, had ruled all life-forms in the past and still ruled the lives of the vast majority of humanity in the third world; in thrall to the majesty of the natural and the transcendent, primitive life flourished in the environment of traditionalism and lawlessness, hallmarks of the epoch of ignorance. By contrast, liberal ideology and modernity were abrasively unmythic, rational and controlled. Liberal order was informed by knowledge, science, a sense of historical progress, a continuously improving future. But this canonical, secular, bracing self-image, is tendentious and substantively illusory: it blithely scants the bloody genealogy and the extant historical record of liberal modernity, liberal politics, and particularly liberal law and its impact on the "lower races" (Hobson). In his Mythology of Modern Law, Fitzpatrick has shown that the enabling claims of liberalism, specifically of liberal law, are not only untenable but implicated in canvassing a racist justification of its colonial past and in eliding the racist basis of the structure of liberal jurisprudence.21 Liberal law is mythic in its presumption of its neutral, objective status. Specifically, the liberal legal story of its immaculate, analytically pure origin obscures and veils not just law's own ruthless, violent, even savage and disorderly trajectory, but also its constitutive association with imperialism and racism.22 In lieu of the transcendent, divine God of the "lower races", modern secular law postulated the gods of History, Science, Freedom. Liberal law was to be the instrument for realizing the promise of progress that the profane gods had decreed. Fitzpatrick's invasive surgical analysis lays bare the underlying logic of law's self-articulation in opposition to the values of cultural-racial Others, and its strategic, continuous reassertion of liberalism's superiority and the civilizational indispensability of liberal legalism. Liberal law's self-presentation presupposes a corrosive, debilitating, anarchic state of nature inhabited by the racial Others and lying in wait at the borders of the enlightened modern West. This mythological, savage Other, creature of raw, natural, unregulated fecundity and sexuality, justified the liberal conquest and control of the racially Other regions.23 Law's violence and resonant savagery on behalf of the West in its imperial razing of cultures and lands of the others, has been and still is, justified in terms of the necessary, beneficial spread of liberal civilization. Fitzpatrick's analysis parallels the impassioned deconstruction of this discourse of domination initiated by Edward Said's Orientalism, itself made possible by the pioneering analyses of writers like Aime Cesaire and Frantz Fanon. Fitzpatrick's argument is nevertheless instructive: his focus on law and its machinations unravels the one concrete province of imperial ideology that is centrally modern and critical in literally transforming and refashioning the human nature of racial Others. For liberal law carries on its back the payload of "progressive", pragmatic, **instrumental modernity**, its ideals of order and rule of law, its articulation of human rights and freedom, its ethic of procedural justice, its hostility to the sacred, to transcendence or spiritual complexity, its recasting of politics as the handmaiden of the nomos, its valorization of scientism and rationalization in all spheres of modern life. Liberal law is not synonymous with modernity tout court, but it is the exemplary voice of its rational spirit, **the custodian of its civilizational ambitions.** For the colonized Others, no non-liberal alternative is available: a non-western route to economic progress is inconceivable in liberal-legal discourse. For even the truly tenacious in the third world will never cease to be, in one sense or another, the outriders of modernity: their human condition condemns them to **playing perpetual catch-up**, eternally subservient to Western economic and technological superiority in a epoch of self-surpassing modernity.24 If the racially Other nations suffer exclusion globally, the racially other minorities inside the liberal loop enjoy the ambiguous benefits of inclusion. As legal immigrants or refugees, they are entitled to the full array of rights and privileges, as citizens (in Canada, France, U.K., U.S—Germany is the exception) they acquire civic and political rights as a matter of law. Formally, they are equal and equally deserving. In theory liberal law is inclusive, but concretely it is routinely **partial and invidious**. Inclusion is conditional: it depends on how robustly the new citizens wear and deploy their cultural difference. Two historical facts account for this phenomenon: liberal law's role in western imperialism and the Western claim of civilizational superiority that pervades the culture that sustains liberal legalism. Liberal law, as the other of the racially Other within its legal jurisdiction, differentiates and locates this other in the enemy camp of the culturally raw, irreducibly foreign, making him an unreliable ally or citizen. Law's suspicion of the others socialized in "lawless" cultures is instinctive and undeniable. Liberal law's constitutive bias is in a sense incidental: the real problem is racism or the racist basis of liberal ideology and culture.25 The internal racial other is not the juridical equal in the mind of liberal law but the juridically and humanly inferior Other, the perpetual foreigner.

#### And, Methods don’t explode limits –

#### It’s tied to the resolution so it can’t be infinite – it can’t make the research burden unbearable if it’s grounded in the literature

#### It’s inevitable – every aff defends more than just the plan text – each plan text is defended differently in different debates and minimal changes constitute something “new” – method debates ensure stability

#### We don’t destroy all norms – The 1AC takes a stance on the authority of the president to enter armed forces into hostilities – the norms you are complaining about are arbitrary and exclusionary

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37 It is no surprise, then, that judgment under an "objective" (or reasonable person) standard generally will favor the stronger party. This, however, is not always the case: Rules that too predictably and reliably favored the strong would be declared unprincipled. n38 The stronger actor must be able to see his favorite principles as fair and [\*819] just -- ones that a reasonable society would rely upon in contested situations. n39 He must be able to depict the current standards as integral to justice, freedom, fairness, and administrability -- to everything short of the American Way itself (and maybe even that, since societies that regulate these relationships more closely are paternalistic, and verge on (shhh!) socialism). n40

#### Focus on pragmatic politics reinforces dominant cultural values and renders oppression invisible which means our aff would be ineffective.

Singer 1990[Joseph William, professor of law at Boston University, September,SYMPOSIUM ON THE RENAISSANCE OF PRAGMATISM IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT: COMMENT: PROPERTY AND COERCION IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CRITICAL AND COMPLACENT PRAGMATISM September, 1990 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1821]

Complacent pragmatism uses unreflective common sense to make situated judgments. This version of pragmatism fails to consider social groups. Rather, it appeals to the values of “our culture” or “our community.” This appeal presumes either that there is consensus on fundamental values or that existing concepts and institutional mechanisms are neutral with respect to value choices. The failure to make explicit the value choices involved in legal doctrines and institutions is problematic because it may lead to an unreflective deference to existing arrangements, thereby silently supporting the status quo. By implicitly reflecting the values of dominant groups this practice may constitute one of Hilary Putnam’s “immunizing strategies” by which oppression is rendered invisible

### Restraint

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the CP – it ignores the central question posed by the 1AC – the process by which policies come to fore is misrepresented and doesn’t challenge the sovereignty that exists – that’s Claude

#### Doesn’t solve any of the aff – IT’s not a question of just not attacking people – that’s obviously terrible – the 1AC criticizes the ways that authority is centralized and the way that effects policy – the Waxman evidence says that the ways that policies are constructed now are rooted in the ideology that rests on the idea that president should have sole decision-making status

#### The CP doesn’t actually challenge these assumptions that create and sustain orientalism – the authority still exists through the discourses that are involved in executive decisionmaking – that’s Kbiri

#### And the counterplan doesn’t solve – it merely attempts to create a norm that doesn’t actually challenge orientalist roots of authority

Friedersdorf, 2013 (Conor, The Atlantic, “Does Obama Really Believe He Can Limit the Next President’s Power?” The Atlantic, May 28, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-believe-he-can-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/)

Over at Fox News, Chris Wallace and Brit Hume are musing about President Obama's aims on national security. What exactly does he hope to accomplish before leaving office in January 2017? Let's listen in: Chris Wallace: It's been suggested that that's exactly what the president wants to do. He wants to leave a different national-security structure, different rules of the road, different limits, for the next president than what he inherited when he came in. Brit Hume: Not only what he inherited, but what he made generous use of for the purposes of fighting this conflict. There's an odd quality, Chris, to this whole thing. And it its almost like he's saying with regard to the drone policy, 'We need something to stop me before I kill again.' You see that in his support -- on an unrelated matter -- of this shield law for journalists. He's carried out these oversteps in pursuing journalists who are doing their jobs. And now he says, 'We need a shield law,' as if to say, a law to protect them from us. I think it's peculiar. I admit to being a bit puzzled myself, if for slightly different reasons. It's perfectly understandable to serve in a position, appreciate its power, and believe it should be limited by outside constraints, even when they'd constrain you. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson both felt that way at times. If Obama feels that way about a shield law, good for him. And it isn't as if he personally approves every interaction the Department of Justice has with journalists. But something puzzles me about his behavior with regard to the War on Terrorism. It does sometimes appear, as Wallace suggests, that he wants to leave a different national-security structure to his predecessor that limits him or her more than Obama himself was limited in 2009. Administration officials have said as much. A disposition matrix! Strict protocol for putting an American citizen on the kill list! That sort of thing. There was talk, before Election 2012, of Team Obama hurriedly developing changes just in case. So unlike Hume, I don't think it's "stop me before I kill again," so much as, "I trust myself with this power more than anyone. You won't always be so lucky as to have me, but don't worry, I'm leaving instructions." Will anyone follow them? That's what I don't understand. Why does Obama seem to think his successors will constrain themselves within whatever limits he sets? Won't they just set their own limits? Won't those limits be very different? What would Chris Christie do in the White House? I have no idea, but I'm guessing that preserving the decisionmaking framework Obama established isn't what he'd do. Does anyone think Hilary Clinton would preserve it? Obama doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any perspicacious limits he places on the executive branch, if he ever gets around to placing any on it. The next president can just undo those "self-imposed" limits with the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in major policy decisions being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and if the next president wants to add names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do it, in s0065cret, per his precedent. Some new John Brennan-like figure, with different values and a different personality, will serve as Moral Rectitude Czar. Even ending torture was done by executive order. The folks guilty of perpetrating it weren't punished. Congress wasn't asked to act. (There was an ambitious domestic agenda to focus on!) So who knows what we'll get next, save for a new president who witnessed all the previously unthinkable things post-9/11 presidents got away with so long as they invoked fighting "terror." The fact that every new president is likely to be a power-seeking egomaniac seems like too obvious a flaw in Obama's plan for a smart guy like him not to see it. So what gives? Is all the talk of limiting the executive branch just talk? But why even talk at this point, if so? He isn't running again. Yet if he really does think his office wields too much power, why is he putting in place safeguards the next president can and probably will undo instead of zealously trying to get Congress to act? Yet he does seem to be concerned. Here's Peter Baker reporting in The New York Times: For nearly four years, the president had waged a relentless war from the skies against Al Qaeda and its allies, and he trusted that he had found what he considered a reasonable balance even if his critics did not see it that way. But now, he told his aides, he wanted to institutionalize what in effect had been an ad hoc war, effectively shaping the parameters for years to come "whether he was re-elected or somebody else became president," as one aide said. Ultimately, he would decide to write a new playbook that would scale back the use of drones, target only those who really threatened the United States, eventually get the C.I.A. out of the targeted killing business and, more generally, begin moving the United States past the "perpetual war" it had waged since Sept. 11, 2001. Whether the policy shifts will actually accomplish that remains to be seen, given vague language and compromises forced by internal debate, but they represent an effort to set the rules even after he leaves office. "We've got this technology, and we're not going to be the only ones to use it," said a senior White House official who, like others involved, declined to be identified talking about internal deliberations. "We have to set standards so it doesn't get abused in the future." There's that same obvious flaw, but everyone seems oblivious to it. The standards you're setting? The next president can just change them. In secret, even! That's the problem with extreme executive power: It is capricious, prone to abuse, and difficult to meaningfully check. Does Obama think the next man or woman will just behold the wisdom of his approach and embrace it? That error, unthinkable as it seems, would not be without precedent for this president.

#### The CP is no different from the status quo – it merely reaffirms the primacy of the president

Scheuerman, 2012 (William, Professor of Political Science and Western European Studies at Indiana University, “Review Essay: Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy”, Law & Social Inquiry, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 743, Lexis)

Posner and Vermeule rely on two main claims. First, even if the president constitutes the dominant actor in a legally unchecked administrative state, he or she has to gain elite and public support to get things done and stand for election. So how can political actors decide whether or not the executive is performing well? Posner and Vermeule tend to hang their hats on "executive signaling": presidents can send signals to voters communicating that they are "well-motivated," and that in fact many voters might make the same (or at least similar) decisions if they possessed the information the president typically has. By communicating in a certain way (e.g., by appointing members of the opposing party to his or her cabinet, promising to accept the recommendations of an independent commission, or by making decisions as transparent as possible), presidents can gain credibility, and voters might thereby come to acknowledge the plausibility--if not necessarily the substantive Tightness--of what the executive is doing (2010, 137-53). However, as Schmitt aptly grasped, even formally free elections potentially become charades when the executive effectively exercises legally unconstrained power (e.g., in Peronist Argentina, or Putin's Russia). Posner and Vermeule never really provide enough evidence for us to dismiss this possibility. Since the president in our system is only subject on one occasion to reelection, it is unclear how their proposals might meaningfully check the executive, particularly during a second term. The fact that executive signaling represents a form of self-binding hardly seems reassuring, either (2010, 135). Nor does the book's highlighting of the possible dangers of different forms of executive signaling (e.g., too much transparency, or an excessive subservience to independent agencies) help very much on this score (2010, 142-46). Why should we expect to get presidents who know how to engage in executive signaling in just the right way? The familiar reason the executive needs elite and popular support, of course, is that it still relies on a popularly elected Congress and other institutional players to get things done: this is why describing such dependence as intrinsically political and "nonlegal" seems odd. For that matter, the relationship between what we traditionally have described as a normative theory of political legitimacy and executive signaling mechanisms--whereby the executive gains popular credibility--remains ambiguous. Is their theory of executive signaling and credibility meant to stand in for a normative theory of legitimacy? If so, one might worry. We can easily imagine an executive diligently doing many of the things prescribed here yet nonetheless pursuing policies deeply at odds with the common good, or at least with what a democratic community under more ideal conditions might determine to be in its best interests. Depending on one's normative preferences, some of the examples provided of executive signaling (e.g., FDR and Obama naming Republicans to their cabinets) might legitimately be taken as evidence for presidential Machiavellianism, rather than as solid proof that the presidents in question were well-motivated and thereby somehow politically acceptable. [\*758] Presidential "signaling" seems like a pale replacement for liberal legalism and the separation of powers.

### PIC

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the CP – they’ve already developed weapons

#### Doesn’t solve anything – still relies on the Idea that North Korea is irrational and can’t use their nuclear weapons – which perpetuates structural violence

#### Claims of Korean “instability” are rooted in exclusionary racism

Tan See **Seng,** Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore, **‘2** [July, “What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of America, IDSS Commentary No. 28, <http://www.sipri.org/contents/library/0210.pdf>]

Otherness, in Wolfowitz’s rendition, is also discursively constituted along a moral/immoral – or, alternatively, responsible/irresponsible – axis. Equally interesting is the notion that authoritarian or rogue-state leaders, besides lacking in rationality and viewing problem solving as a form of weakness, are “ruthless and avaricious” – an intentional, not accidental, choice of predicates. That (and here we are left to infer) “North Korea” or “Iraq” is ruled by such roguish elements can only mean that such states can, indeed they should, therefore be properly referred to as rogue states. Against these inscriptions of immorality or amorality stand, in diametric contrast, moral “America.” And here the unequal adoption by Wolfowitz’s discourse, in the case of “democracies,” of the analytical level of state/regime connotes that all America, and not only its leaders or certain individuals, is thereby kind, compassionate, altruistic – the polar opposite of all that rogue states, and possibly even China and Russia, represent. To be sure, nowhere in his words does Wolfowitz imply that there are as such no immoral or irresponsible Americans. Nor does he even hint that all citizens of rogue states are therefore roguish; political correctness, after all, is the norm in these enlightened times. But the discursive effect is such that we are left with the impression that leaders of rogue nations – Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong-il, and their ilk – epitomize the darkest of the dark metaphysics of human nature. And roguish as such are their foreign policies. In his evaluation of the missile threat from North Korea, the deputy CIA director asserted: Like everyone else, we knew the [Pyongyang] regime was brutal within its borders and a menace beyond. Its commando raids into South Korea and its assassination attempts against successive South Korean presidents – including the 1983 bombings in Rangoon that killed 21 people – were clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.62 Again, it bears reminding that the argument here does not refuse the historical “reality” and tragic consequences either of Pyongyang’s oppressive policies at home or its ruinous forays abroad. In terms of exclusionary practices, however, interpretive conclusions concerning the brutality of the Pyongyang regime cannot be separated from the morality axis on which this particular statement turns. What, for instance, is the effect created by the use of the opening phrase, “Like everyone else”? To who exactly does “everyone” refer? That this analysis is intelligible at all depends upon the presupposition that this particular reading – an American reading, to be precise – is universally accepted by one and all. But this is clearly not the case as implied by the vociferous and potentially violent tide of militant Muslims in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East, who hold Washington in contempt for the latter’s alleged “brutality” and “menace” toward, say, the Iraqis, (by proxy) the Palestinians, or (most recently) the Afghans. As such, the discursive effect of the preceding constructions is the naturalization of the Pyongyang regime as immoral, irresponsible, or just plain evil given the damning evidence of dastardly deeds that proffer “clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.” Further, that the enumerated acts above were those perpetrated by Kim Il-song and not by his son, Kim Chong-il, seems not to matter in this analysis, although it is the latter Kim’s government with whom the Bush Administration must deal. This is not to imply that this intelligence estimate on Kim was essentially all caricature and thereby shorn of “truth.” The CIA official continues in his assessment: It is easy to caricature Kim Chong-il – either as a simple tyrant blind to his dilemma or as a technocratic champion of sweeping change. But the extreme views of him tend to be the product of bias, ignorance, or wishful thinking. The reality is more complex… Like his father, he has been shrewd enough to make bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy. He knows that proliferation is something we want to stop. Thus, Kim Chong-il has tried to drum up outside assistance by trading off international concerns about his missile programs and sales. He has – more subtly, of course – done much the same thing with foreign fears of renewed famine and the chaos that could accompany any unravelling of his regime.63 The evident attempt at nuance in the above analysis, however, does not preclude the continued deployment of representational practices along the axis of responsibility. “Like his father,” we are told, the “shrewd” Kim makes “bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy” – an indication of chronic irresponsibility in North Korea’s international relations. We may note here the likely intrusive influence of another discourse, particularly that on nineteenth-century European diplomacy as it figures in American intellectual and popular culture. As historian Barbara Tuchman once noted, for most Americans the notion of diplomacy carries with it “all the wicked devices of the Old World, spheres of influence, balances of power, secret treatises, triple alliances”64 and other such forms of Machiavellian intrigue for which America, idealized as the New World – a seemingly virginal, innocent, and righteous identity – had no place. Indeed, just such a pristine identity is often adduced as the universal ideal to which all nations and peoples are presumed to aspire – a point made forcefully in the earlier cited “end of history” thesis popular in mainstream political debate at the close of the Cold War.65 In other words, what is good for America is obviously good for the whole world (or, at least those parts that are “rational,” “responsible,” “moral”). “Missile defense,” one congressman averred, “is for Americans, for Europeans, for Russians, and for all peace-loving peoples on the face of the Earth.”66 Without ignoring or denying North Korean complicity in the light of its sizeable transfers of missile technology to the Middle East, what those exclusionary practices produce is the materializing effect of a Pyongyang regime that, if anything, can be expected to harm the US at the slightest provocation – a representation of danger that finds easy resonance with American policymakers because of its familiarity rather than any likelihood of such an eventuation. Further, what is effaced or erased by the above statement are plausible illustrations of bad behaviour in American foreign policy: a policy orientation that, even by most orthodox accounts, has been realist – in both its prudential as well as Machiavellian aspects – throughout much of the Cold War period.67 Indeed, this effacement stands out starkly in the light of resistant discourses – mostly but not exclusively from European sources – which portray America as a rogue state68 given the apparent lack of “strategic restraint” in its post-Cold War foreign policy.69 Hence the tenuousness of such constructions of identity through excluding contradictions and tensions that are as much a part of Self as it is of the Other.

### Politics

#### The question of the debate is how we orient ourselves ethically toward the resolution – the disad obfuscates that question in order to ensure that structural violence exists unabated – the only way to ethically act in the face of whiteness is to take the position of the disaffected group – that’s Martinot

#### And, Structural violence outweighs

Nixon 11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

#### Their understanding of politics is flawed – there is no one actor that does things but an interrelated group of people acting not just logically but based on a number of different things – the debate should be about whether or not the world where the president can’t preempt proliferation is good or bad – the process is irrelevant and their attempt to understand that creates a bad model for debate – that’s Claude – I’ll finish that now

Claude 1988(Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–

alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

**Obama won’t push, dodges fights**

Jack **Goldsmith 13**, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, Feb 13 2013, "The President’s SOTU Pledge to Work With Congress and Be Transparent on National Security Issues," [www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/the-presidents-sotu-pledge-to-work-with-congress-and-be-transparent-on-national-security-issues/](http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/the-presidents-sotu-pledge-to-work-with-congress-and-be-transparent-on-national-security-issues/) CMR

**As for a broader and sturdier congressional framework** for the administration’s growing forms of secret war (not just targeted killing, but special forces activities around the globe, cyber attacks, modern forms of covert action, etc.) along the lines that I proposed last week, I also don’t think much will happen. **Friends and acquaintances** in and **around** the **Obama** administration **told me** they would cherish such a new statutory framework, but argued that **Congress is too political**, and executive-congressional relations too poisonous, **for** **anything** like this **to happen**. There is some truth in this charge, although I sense that Congress is preparing to work more constructively on these issues. But even in the face of a very political and generally unsupportive Congress, Presidents tend to get what they want in national security when they make the case publicly and relentlessly. (Compare the Bush administration’s successful push for FISA reform in the summer of 2008, when the President’s approval ratings were below 30%, and Democrats controlled both houses of Congress; or FDR’s push in late 1940 and early 1941 – against popular and congressional opposition – to secure enactment of Lend-Lease legislation to help to British fend off the Nazis; or the recent FISA renewal legislation.) And of course the administration can never succeed if it doesn’t try hard. Not fighting the fight for national security legal reform is just another way of saying that **the matter is not important enough to the administration to warrant a fight**. **The administration’s failure to** date to **make a sustained push** before Congress **on these issues reveals a preference for reliance on** ever-more-tenuous **old authorities** and secret executive branch interpretations in areas ranging from drones to cyber, **and a**n implicit **judgment that the political** and legal **advantages** that would flow **from a national debate** and refreshed and clarified authorities **are** simply **not worth the effort**. The administration might be right in this judgment, at least for itself in the short run. But the President has now pledged something different in his SOTU address. We will see if he follows through this time. Count me as skeptical, but hopeful that I am wrong.

***Ideology outweighs* and *no spillover***

**Edwards 3** – George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A26M University and Former Director of the Center for Presidential Studies, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion", [www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http%3A//www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF), CMR

**Passing legislation** **was** **even more difficult on** the **divisive domestic issues** that¶ remained on Congress’s agenda, including health care, environmental protection, energy,¶ the economy, the faith-based initiative, corporate malfeasance, judicial nominees, and¶ taxes. The **politics of the war on terrorism did not fundamentally alter** the **consideration of**¶ **these issues,** which continued to divide the public and their representatives in Congress as¶ they had before. The **inevitable differences** between the parties **emerged** predictably,¶ exacerbated by the narrow majorities in each chamber and the jockeying for advantage in¶ the midterm elections.¶ Bipartisanship **in** **one arena** (the war on terrorism) **does not** necessarily **carry over**¶ **in another**. As the parties in Congress have become more homogeneous over time and as¶ the number of competitive seats has shrunk, especially in the House, the differences¶ between the parties have increased. The opposition party is not very fertile ground for¶ presidents on most issues – even during wartime. Thus, the president failed to obtain¶ many of his priority items in 2002, including making the 2001 tax cuts permanent and¶ passing his fiscal stimulus program, a robust faith-based initiative, and drilling rights in the¶ Artic National Wildlife Reserve. No progress was made on partially privatizing Social¶ Security, banning cloning and certain kinds of abortion, and passing private-school tax¶ credits, and the president experienced plenty of frustration on obtaining confirmation of¶ his judicial appointees. He also had to sign a farm bill that was much more costly than he¶ wanted.¶ In December 2001, the president concluded quiet negotiations with the Democrats¶ led by Senator Edward Kennedy and signed a bill on education reform. The president was¶ able to claim a victory on one of his priority issues, even though he had to give up many of¶ the most controversial elements of his original proposal. It is significant that to¶ accomplish even this much, the president chose to stay private rather than go public.¶ The modest impact of Bush’s approval is not surprising. **The president’s** public¶ **support must compete for influence with other**, **more stable factors that affect voting in**¶ **Congress, including ideology, party, personal views and commitments on specific policies,**¶ **and constituency interests.** **Although constituency interests may seem to overlap with**¶ **presidential approval, they should be viewed as distinct**. **It is quite possible for**¶ **constituents to approve of the president but oppose him on particular policies**, and it is¶ opinions on these policies that will ring most loudly in congressional ears. **Members of**¶ **Congress are unlikely to vote against the clear interests of their constituents or the firm**¶ **tenets of their ideology solely in deference to a widely supported chief executive**.45

## 1AR

### Solvency

#### Action now prevents worst impacts – not a yes/no question

Nuccitelli 12

[Dana, is an environmental scientist at a private environmental consulting firm in the Sacramento, California area. He has a Bachelor's Degree in astrophysics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis. He has been researching climate science, economics, and solutions as a hobby since 2006, and has contributed to Skeptical Science since September, 2010, <http://www.skepticalscience.com/realistically-what-might-future-climate-look-like.html>, HM]

We're not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that 'danger limit'. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future. Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we're not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon

and as much as possible. There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possiblity, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome. And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution - carbon pricing - can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4).

### NK

#### Their threats evidence misunderstands the way the international system works – all of their threats now and prolif now evidence proves

Trachtenberg 2000 (Prof of History, Pennsylvania (Marc, The "Accidental War" Question, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadv(1).pdf, CMR)

The second point has to do with how much risk there really is in situations of this sort. It should not be assumed too readily that states underestimate the degree to which they lose control of the situation when they engage in a crisis. States can generally **pull back from the brink** if they really want to; prestige will be sacrificed, but often states are willing to pay that price. The history of international politics in the century that just ended is **full of crises** that were liquidated by one side accepting what amounted to defeat, sometimes even humiliating defeat; and in the July Crisis in 1914, the German government chose at the most critical moment to let the war come rather than press for a compromise solution.9 The key thing here is that in 1914 and 1939 political leaders had not totally lost control, but had chosen to accept war rather than back off in a crisis. Their aversion to war was not overwhelming. But when both sides very much want to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, the story is very different. This was the case during the Cold War. People sometimes seem to assume that peace was hanging by a thread during that conflict, and that we were lucky to make our way through it without a thermonuclear holocaust. But I don't think this is true at all: and in general I think it is **very unlikely** that a great war would break out if both sides are determined to avoid it. These arguments about how war could break out almost by accident were frequently made during the Cold War itself--and indeed were made by responsible and experie nced officials. A British document from March 1946, for example, argued that the Soviets did not want war, but the kind of tactics they used with the West might lead to a war that neither side wanted: "although the intention may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with American or ourselves."10 A year later, a British Foreign Office official warned that the fact that the Soviets had military superiority in Europe might make them careless, and that they might "misjudge what measures can safely be taken without producing a serious crisis." Events might get out of control and a situation might develop that could "lead to disaster."11 What is wrong with this point of view? It assumes that the Soviets would not be cautious, that they would not frame their actions very carefully with an eye to the American reaction, that in deciding how far to go they would not gauge very closely how the Americans reacted to the measures they had taken up to that point. This point of view assumes also that the Soviets would find it very hard to draw back if it became clear that they had overstepped the bounds and had thought the American reaction would not be as vigorous as it in fact was--or indeed that they had not made the mental reservation that they could draw back, in necessary, when they decided to embark on a provocative course of action. Basically the assumption is that the Soviets did not care enough about what a war would entail to take these rather elementary and normal precautions. This point of view also assumes that the American response would be very rigid and "spring-loaded": a slight Soviet infringement, and the Americans immediately take the plunge into general war--as though there are no intermediate measures of a political or military nature that would be taken, no process that would unfold within which the two sides would test each other out before resorting to extreme measures. To my mind, anyone with any sense should know that things would **never** move directly and mechanically from initial provocation to full-scale war, that things would unfold almost inevitably in a more complex way--or, in short, that enough "**cushioning**" exists in the system to keep relatively minor provocations from leading directly to general war.

#### The CP doesn’t solve – threats fail at deescalating conflict

Roland Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003 (“A Rogue Is A Rogue Is A Rogue: US Foreign Policy And The Korean Nuclear Crisis,” *International Affairs*, Volume 79, Issue 4, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 736-737)

This article has examined the underlying patterns that shaped the two Korean nuclear crises of the last decade. In each case, in 1993–4 and in 2002–3, the crisis allegedly emerged suddenly and was largely attributed to North Korea’s problematic behaviour, most notably to its nuclear brinkmanship. But a more thorough analysis of the events reveals a far more complex picture. Given the deeply entrenched antagonistic Cold War atmosphere on the peninsula, the most recent crisis hardly comes as a surprise. Indeed, a crisis is always already present: the question is simply when and how it is perceived and represented as such. Responsibility for the nuclear crisis is equally blurred.

North Korea undoubtedly bears a large part of it. Pyongyang has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not shy away from generating tension to promote its own interests, particularly when the survival of the regime is at stake. Even a primitive North Korean nuclear programme poses a grave threat to the region, not least because it could unleash a new nuclear arms race. But Pyongyang’s actions have not taken place in a vacuum. They occurred in response to internal as well as external circumstances. The central point to keep in mind here is that North Korea has been subject to over half a century of clear and repeated American nuclear threats. Few decision-makers and defence analysts realize the extent to which these threats have shaped the security dilemmas on the peninsula. If one steps back from the immediate and highly emotional ideological context that still dominates security interactions on the peninsula, then the attitude and behaviour of North Korea and the US bear striking similarities. Both have contributed a great deal to each other’s fears. Both have also used their fears to justify aggressive military postures. And both rely on a strikingly similar form of crisis diplomacy. But the ensuing interactive dynamics are largely hidden behind a rationalized security policy that presents threats in a one-dimensional manner. The image of North Korea as an evil and unpredictable rogue state is so deeply entrenched that any crisis can easily be attributed to Pyongyang’s problematic actions, even in the face of contradictory evidence. Keeping up this image, and the threat projections that are associated with it, requires constant work. The specialized discourse on security and national defence contributes to the performance of this task. It presents threats in a highly technical manner and in a jargon-ridden language that is inaccessible to all but a few military experts. As a result, a very subjective and largely one-sided interpretation of security dilemmas has come to be accepted as real and politically legitimate. [end page 736] Articles on defence issues usually end with policy recommendations. Not so this one, even though much could be said about a great many crucial issues, such as the possibility of involving China as a way of reaching a compromise between Pyongyang’s insistence on bilateral negotiations and Washington’s preference for a multilateral approach. But trying to identify the underlying patterns of Korea’s security dilemmas seems a big enough task on its own. This conclusion, then, takes on a more modest tone and merely draws attention to the type of mindset with which the challenges ahead may be approached more successfully. Required more than anything is what Gertrude Stein sought to capture through the metaphor that served as a model for the title of this article:80 the political and moral obligation to question the assumption that something is how it is and how it has always been; the need to replace old and highly problematic Cold War thinking patterns with new and more sensitive attempts to address the dilemmas of Korean security.